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ESSAYS
"EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES": THE LEGACY




Centered on the ideology of the "Gang of 14," Professors
Gerhardt and Painter provide a critique on modern fed-
eral judicial appointments and offer suggestions for the
nomination process. This essay discusses the bipartisan
group of senators who joined together to control the future
of judicial nominations agreeing not to support a filibus-
ter on a nominee unless there were "extraordinary circum-
stances," and the later impact of the disintegration of that
group. Going forward, the authors propose streamlining
the nomination process through eliminating the judicial
filibuster in most circumstances and increasing transpar-
ency by compelling senators to disclose their reservations
on nominees. Pointing toward the self-regulation of the
political system, the authors assert that their proposal
will be in accord with senatorial tradition and will ensure
that nominees are treated fairly and are sufficiently vet-
ted to make certain each jurist falls within the bounds of
accepted jurisprudence.'
* Michael J. Gerhardt, Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor in Constitutional Law &
Director, Center for Law and Government, University of North Carolina School of Law.
** Richard W. Painter, S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law, University of
Minnesota Law School.
1. Professor Carl W. Tobias, along with other scholars, provides further discussion on
the nomination process and opportunities for reform. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial
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On May 23, 2005, seven Republican and seven Democratic sen-
ators banded together to block a movement that would have
changed the Senate forever. Because the Senate at that moment
was almost evenly divided over a radical plan to revise the rules
of the Senate to bar judicial filibusters without following the Sen-
ate's rules for making such a revision, the "Gang of 14,"2 as the
senators became known, controlled the future of judicial filibus-
ters. They each agreed not to support a filibuster of a judicial
nomination unless there were "extraordinary circumstances." For
the remainder of George W. Bush's presidency the agreement
held and there were no filibusters of judicial nominations. But, in
the past two and a half years, several developments have threat-
ened the continued viability of the agreement of the Gang of 14:
Five members of the Gang are no longer in the Senate;3 Demo-
crats took control of both the House and the Senate in 20064 and
managed to maintain a majority of seats in the Senate, albeit by a
thinner margin, in 2010;5 and delays and obstruction of judicial
nominations re-intensified after President Obama came into of-
fice.' Perhaps most importantly, the remaining Republican mem-
bers of the Gang of 14 have each found "extraordinary circum-
stances" justifying their support of some judicial filibusters.
Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985 (2012); Sunday Dia-
logue: Getting Judges Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2 012/03/04/opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue-getting-judges-confirmed.html?_r=1&pagewa
nted=all.
2. The members of the Gang of 14 were Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV); Lincoln
Chafee (R-RI); Susan Collins (R-ME); Mike DeWine (R-OH); Lindsey Graham (R-SC); Dan-
iel Inouye (D-HI); Mary Landrieu (D-LA); Joseph Lieberman (D-CT); John McCain (R-AZ);
Ben Nelson (D-NE); Mark Pryor (D-AR); Ken Salazar (D-CO); Olympia Snowe (R-ME); and
John Warner (R-VA). See James Kuhnhenn & Steven Thomma, Divisions Seen on Alito
Among Key Senate Group, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 3, 2005, at A2.
3. Mike DeWine and Lincoln Chafee lost their reelection bids. See John M. Broder,
Democrats Topple G.O.P. Incumbents in Three Senate Contests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P5.
John Warner retired from the Senate. See Robin Toner, Virginia Senator Will Retire in 2008,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at All. President Obama appointed Ken Salazar as Secretary of
the Interior. See Jim Tankersley & Julie Cart, Obama's Pick for Interior May Alter West-
ern Terrain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at Al. Robert Byrd died in office. See Adam Cly-
mer, Robert C. Byrd, 1917-2010: A Pillar of the Senate, A Champion for His State, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2010, at Al.
4. See John M. Broder, Democrats Take Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at Al.
5. See Richard Wolf, GOP Picks Up Senate Seats, But Not Enough, USA TODAY, Nov.
3, 2010, at A6.
6. See Michael Falcone, Conservatives Plan Offensive on Obama's Judicial Nominees,
N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Nov. 14, 2008, 4:56 PM), http://thecaucas.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/
14/conservatives-planoffensive-on-obamas-judicial-nominees/.
7. Humberto Sanchez, Filibuster Tests Senate Agreements on Judicial Nominees,
970 [Vol. 46:969
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Of these developments, the most confounding has been the un-
certainty over the "extraordinary circumstances" that should jus-
tify judicial filibusters. At the time of their initial agreement, the
Gang of 14 recognized that "each signatory must use his or her
own discretion and judgment in determining whether [extraordi-
nary] circumstances exist."' Shortly thereafter, the members dis-
cussed their understanding of the standard in the midst of the
confirmation hearings on John Roberts's nomination to be Chief
Justice of the United States. Echoing the sentiments of their col-
leagues, both Senators Mike DeWine (R-OH) and Joseph Lieber-
man (I-CT) declared that the standard was "We'll define it when
we see it,"' while Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said he be-
lieved that ideological attacks are not an "extraordinary circum-
stance." "To me, it would have to be a character problem, an eth-
ics problem, some allegation about the qualifications of a person,
not an ideological bent."10 However, in President Obama's first
two and a half years in office, his judicial nominations have been
subjected to various delays and obstruction, including two suc-
cessful filibusters upheld by each of the remaining Republican
members of the Gang of 14." Almost forty of the President's judi-
cial nominations are still pending before the Senate, including
nine to the federal courts of appeals, while eighty-three judicial
vacancies remain, thirty-five of which are considered emergencies
based upon, among other things, extremely high caseloads.12
We cannot square this state of affairs with what the Gang of 14
had originally wanted or with any credible, neutral standard of
"extraordinary circumstances." The Gang of 14 had hoped that
their bipartisan compromise would facilitate judicial appoint-
ROLL CALL (Dec. 7, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues57_701filibuster_
tests-senate agreement-210833-1.html.
8. 151 CONG. REC. 10931 (2005).
9. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators Who Averted Showdown Face New Test in Court
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2005), http://nytimes.com/2005/07/14/politics/14gang.html.
10. Charles Babington & Susan Schmidt, Filibuster Deal Puts Democrats in a Bind,
WASH.POST, July 4, 2005, at Al.
11. See Felicia Sonmez, Senate Republican Filibuster Blocks Obama D.C. Circuit
Nominee Caitlin Halligan, WASH. POST BLOG (Dec. 6, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/senate-republican-filibuster-blocks-obama-d-circuit-
nominee-caitlin-halligan/2011/12/06/gIQAtp6n2Oblog.html (discussing Republican filibus-
ters of court of appeals nominees Caitlin Halligan and Goodwin Liu).
12. Judicial Emergencies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeShi
ps/JudicialVacancies/Judicial Emergencies.aspx (last updated Apr. 8, 2012); Judicial
Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacanci
es/aspx (last updated Apr. 17, 2012).
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ments and remove ideological differences as a ground of objection
to a nomination as long as the nominee's views were within the
mainstream of American jurisprudence and he or she had sound
character and no serious ethical lapses. Instead, judicial filibus-
ters, among other means of obstruction within the Senate, have
been persistently directed at judicial nominees on the basis of
speculation and distortion. These tactics have prevented the fed-
eral judiciary from operating at full strength and have made the
process of judicial selection unpredictable for everyone concerned,
including the White House, the Senate, and the nominees.
In this essay, we analyze how the standard of "extraordinary
circumstances" should work in the Senate's consideration of judi-
cial nominations. In the first part, we briefly examine the origins
and consequences of the Gang of 14's agreement and the ensuing
degradation of the judicial confirmation process. In Part II, we
propose a standard that individual senators should consider fol-
lowing in assessing and voting on judicial nominations. In the fi-
nal part, we show how the proposed understanding of "extraordi-
nary circumstances" fits within the finest traditions of the
Senate. While we understand the temptation to politicize judicial
nominations can sometimes be strong, we hope that our proposed
understanding of "extraordinary circumstances" is in the same
spirit as the initial agreement of the Gang of 14 as well as the re-
cent bipartisan agreement to abandon anonymous holds of nomi-
nations." We believe the proposal gives senators a useful, princi-
pled, neutral framework for discharging their constitutional
responsibility of Advice and Consent and for preventing any fur-
ther damage to the federal judiciary and the Constitution.
I. THE GANG OF 14 AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
While a majority vote of the Senate is the only way for a judi-
cial nomination to be confirmed,14 there are many ways to defeat
13. See Paul Kane, Senate Leaders Agree on Changes in Filibuster, Confirmation Pro-
cess, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2011, at A5.
14. ELIZABETH RYBicKi, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31980, SENATE CONSIDERATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS: COMMITTEE AND FLOOR PROCEDURE 10 (2011); see also
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, JUDIcIARY NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRM-




one. First, the full Senate could vote to reject the nomination. In
fact, the Senate has rejected more than one in five Supreme
Court nominations, and the Senate has rejected many other judi-
cial nominations." The most recent instance in which the Senate
rejected a lower court nomination was the 1999 rejection of Presi-
dent Clinton's nomination of Ronnie White to a U.S. District
Court judgeship in Missouri." Second, the full Senate could not
take any action or table a nomination. For instance, the Senate
tabled, or took no action and therefore effectively nullified, sever-
al Supreme Court nominations, including President Jackson's
nomination of Roger Taney as an Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court." Third, the Senate Judiciary Committee could vote
to reject a nomination or fail to take a final vote-or, for that
matter, any other action, including holding a hearing-on a nom-
ination. Indeed, this is what happened to two well-publicized
nominations in the past: President George H. W. Bush's nomina-
tion of John Roberts to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia'" and President Clinton's nomination of Elena Kagan
to that same court." Fourth, individual senators could exercise a
temporary hold on a nomination either in committee or on the
floor of the Senate. A hold might prove fatal to a nomination if it
is done late in a legislative session or if various senators tag team
or ask for a hold seriatim. For example, Senator Ron Johnson (R-
W1) has recently exercised this prerogative to block two of Presi-
dent Obama's judicial nominations-Louis Butler to a U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Wisconsin and Victoria Nourse to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.20 Last but not least, senators
might filibuster a judicial nomination. Filibusters have been the
least employed but most controversial method of obstruction.2 '
15. See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31171, SUPREME COURT
NOMINATIONS NOT CONFIRMED 1789-AUGUST 2010, at 5 (2010).
16. Charles Babington & Joan Biskupic, Senate Rejects Judicial Nominee: Clinton De-
cries 'Disgraceful' Party Vote on Black Jurist, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1999, at Al.
17. HOGUE, supra note 15, at 3.
18. David G. Savage, Bush's Judicial Nominees Go 28 for 80 in the Senate, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2001, at 12.
19. Senate's 'Hollow Charade' Returns With Kagan as the Star, USA TODAY, June 28,
2010, at Al7.
20. Bruce Vielmetti, Posts Look Less Likely for 2 Judicial Nominees, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, May 26, 2011, at A7.
21. See Lyle Denniston, High Court May Hinge on Filibuster Debate, Bos. GLOBE,
June 2, 2003, at A2.
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The process of filibustering a judicial nomination-or any other
matter-is relatively straightforward. The Senate Rules, in fact,
provide for extended, protracted, and even endless debate over a
disputed legislative matter.22 In particular, Senate Rule XXII pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that a debate on the Senate floor may on-
ly be stopped voluntarily or if at least sixty senators vote for clo-
ture, i.e., to end debate.23 The rule does not specify which matters
may be filibustered.2 4
While filibusters of judicial nominations have been relatively
rare, they have not been unprecedented. Perhaps the best known
is the filibuster that effectively killed President Lyndon Johnson's
nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice of the United
States.25 More recently, Democrats in the Senate filibustered-
and therefore blocked cloture on-almost a dozen of President
George W. Bush's federal courts of appeals nominations.26
Frustration over the inability to end the filibusters of Bush
nominees, particularly the filibuster of the nomination of Miguel
Estrada to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
prompted the Senate Majority Leader at the time, Bill Frist (R-
TN), to seriously consider deploying the so-called "nuclear option"
to end such filibusters." The proponents of the "nuclear option"
(or, as they called it, the "constitutional option") maintained that
filibustering judicial nominations was based on a misreading of
Senate Rule XXII." They believed that this rule was never de-
signed to allow for the filibustering of a judicial nomination and
that the appropriate method for curbing such abuse was to get a
formal Senate ruling on its propriety. To do this, they devised the
following plan.
22. See generally S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMINISTRATION, 112TH CONG., RULES OF THE
SENATE R. XXII (2011).
23. Id. at R. XXII(2).
24. See id.
25. Charles Babington, Filibuster Precedent? Democrats Point to '68 and Fortas,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2005, at A3.
26. See Byron York, Eye-for-an-Eye Filibuster Stops Democratic Nominee, WASH.
EXAMINER (May 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/parities/2011/05/eye-eye-
filibuster-stops-democratic-nominee/1 14206.
27. Mark Leibovich, In the Senate, the Escalation of Rhetoric, WASH. POST, May 17,
2005, at Cl.
28. See generally Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to
Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28




First, after an unsuccessful effort to vote cloture on a judicial
nomination, the Senate Majority Leader would ask the Parlia-
mentarian of the Senate to rule on whether filibustering a judi-
cial nomination was consistent with a proper reading of Rule
XXII. Second, if anyone disagreed with the Parliamentarian's de-
termination that such filibusters were inconsistent with the Sen-
ate rules, it could be appealed to the Presiding Officer of the Sen-
ate, the Vice President of the United States.
Third, the Vice President at the time, Dick Cheney, was ex-
pected to uphold interpreting Rule XXII to not allow a filibuster of
a judicial nomination.29 The Vice President's ruling could in turn
be appealed to the full Senate, which could affirm or overrule it
by a majority vote. Since Republicans held a majority of the seats
in the Senate in 2005, the expectation was that, as long as the
vote followed party lines, Republicans would affirm the ruling of
the Vice President.o The plan was called the "nuclear option" be-
cause if a majority vote could be used to change the rule (as op-
posed to following the requirements spelled out in the rule itself),
then a majority vote could be used to change any other rule or
procedure in the Senate that a majority did not like." The only
recourse that would have been left to Democrats would simply
have been to walk out in protest or attempt in vain to use other
Senate traditions to get their way, such as unanimous consent to
schedule floor votes, which could just as easily be cast aside as
the filibustering of judicial nominations." The upshot would have
been that the Senate would have ceased to be the place it had al-
ways been-a place in which collegiality was the order of the day
and each senator had as much power as any other to dictate the
flow of events within the institution. Both sides would have
blamed each other for the meltdown.
To prevent this collapse, the Gang of 14 agreed to preserve
Rule XXII, but the agreement turned on each member's under-
standing of when it might be appropriate to filibuster a judicial
29. See Michael Gerhardt & Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary, Senate's "Nuclear Op-
tion," L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at M5; see also Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In
Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nominations, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 331, 348 (2005).
30. Gerhardt & Chemerinsky, supra note 29.
31. See Warren Richey, The Senate, Judges, and the Filibuster, CHRISTIAN ScL.
MONITOR, Apr. 25, 2005, at 1.
32. Gerhardt & Chemerinsky, supra note 29.
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nomination in the future." Initially, the members all seemed to
agree that ideological differences would not constitute "extraordi-
nary circumstances," though, in the confirmation proceedings for
both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, signs of disagree-
ment among the members on the meaning of the standard be-
came apparent.34
Since President Obama took office, there have been four cloture
votes on filibusters of judicial nominations. Two cloture petitions
were withdrawn after agreement was reached on the nomina-
tions," while three other cloture votes succeeded.36  The single,
unsuccessful cloture vote pertained to President Obama's nomi-
nation of Goodwin Liu to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.3 ' Each member of the Gang of 14 that voted against the
cloture motion explained his or her reasoning in a formal state-
ment. For instance, Senator Graham explained that Liu's "outra-
geous attack on Justice Alito" in his testimony on Alito's nomina-
tion "convinced me that Goodwin Liu is an ideologue. His
statement showed he has nothing but disdain for those who disa-
gree with him." Senator Graham added that "Liu should run for
elected office, not serve as a judge. Ideologues have their place,
just not on the bench."3  Senator Susan M. Collins (R-ME) ex-
plained that, "[t]here is much to respect, admire, and like about
Goodwin Liu, but his activist judicial philosophy precludes me
33. Carolyn Lochhead, Senate to Vote on Judge Owen, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 2005, at
A14.
34. See Mary Curtis & Richard Simon, Bush's Supreme Court Nominee, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2005, at A14 (discussing Alito nomination); Gwyneth K. Shaw, Filibuster on Rob-
erts Looks Unlikely, BALT. SUN, July 22, 2005, at Al (discussing Roberts nomination).
35. Cloture petitions were withdrawn regarding the nominations of Thomas Vanaskie
and Denny Chin. RICHARD S. BETH & BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32878,
CLOTURE ATTEMPTS ON NOMINATIONS 10 (2012).
36. The Senate voted for cloture on the nominations of David Hamilton to the Seventh
Circuit, Barbara Keenan to the Fourth Circuit, and John McConnell to the U.S. District
Court in Rhode Island. Id. at 9-11. Subsequently, the Senate confirmed each of these judg-
es by wide margins. Id.
37. James Olphant, Court Nominee Withdraws, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A12.
38. Meredith Shiner, Senate GOP Filibusters Goodwin Liu, POLITICO (May 20, 2011,
9:19 AM), http://www.politico.comInews/stories/0511/55320.html.
39. Press Release, Senator Lindsey Graham, Graham Opposes Cloture on Nomination





from supporting him for a lifetime appointment on the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals."40 Similarly, Senator Snowe said that
While the nominee is obviously exceptionally talented with a keen
legal mind, after an exhaustive examination, regrettably I find that
the nominee's record reveals a depth and breadth of writings and
statements-including testimony before the Judiciary Committee
nomination hearing for Justice Samuel Alito-that, for me, raise se-
rious and insurmountable concerns about the nominee's ability to
transition to a judicial appointment that requires objectivity.41
Liu has since been unanimously confirmed to the California Su-
preme Court.
In the aftermath of the vote to deny cloture on the filibuster of
the Liu nomination, the costs of the absence of any bipartisan
agreement on the standard of "exceptional circumstances" have
been obvious to everyone.
First, President Obama has been left with no way of predicting
what types of issues will be treated as "extraordinary circum-
stances" justifying judicial filibusters in the future. Though the
President has tried to find consensus nominations, there are no
impartial benchmarks for him to follow in avoiding "extraordi-
nary circumstances," and the temptation to obstruct may be too
strong for many senators to resist, particularly as the year of the
next presidential election nears.
Second, well-qualified, well-meaning judicial nominees are sub-
ject to distortions of their records and their characters. President
Obama has taken care to nominate to judgeships people whose
qualifications and views of the law are well within the main-
stream of American jurisprudence. The American Bar Associa-
tion, among other organizations, has given the highest possible
ratings for almost all of the nominations that have been obstruct-
ed, including that of Goodwin Liu.43 None of the President's judi-
40. Press Release, Senator Susan Collins, Senator Collins' Statement on Goodwin Liu
Nomination (May 19, 2011), available at http://collins.senate.gov/public/continue.cfm?Fuse
Action=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord id=09efbblc-fa8a-2a7c-dc44-2a982aebb
aff&Region id=&Issueid=&CFID=35211670487&CFTOKEN=84501033.
41. Press Release, Senator Olympia Snowe, Snowe Statement on Appellate Court
Nominee (May 19, 2011), available at http://snowe.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressre
leases?ContentRecord id=d8240ce6-5ae4-41c7-bb3c-814cef985c05&ContentType-id=ae7a
6475-aOlf-4da5-aa94-0a98973de620&Group-id=2643ccf9-0d03-4d09-9082-380703lcb84a.
42. Meura Dolan, Accolades as Justice Confirmed; Newest Member of State Supreme
Court Had Contentious Federal Nomination, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at AA1.
43. See AM. BAR ASS'N, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III JUDICIAL NOMINEES (Mar. 1, 2012),
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cial nominees have threatened the basic doctrine of American law
or shown resistance to following Supreme Court precedent, much
less any serious ethical breaches. President Obama's nominees
have been widely admired by people from both parties, and all of
them have come from the mainstream of practice, judicial service,
or teaching. There is nothing "extraordinary" about the Presi-
dent's judicial nominees except for their qualifications.
Third, senators are at a loss to find critical common ground in
the confirmation process. If a nominee's philosophy is not extreme
and poses no threat to basic doctrine or the proper functioning of
American courts, and if a nominee has committed no serious ethi-
cal breaches, no other appropriate basis for objection to a nomina-
tion exists.
Last but not least, the absence of an appropriate framework or
standard for evaluating nominees hurts the federal judiciary. The
understaffing of federal courts has created many judicial emer-
gencies-over thirty of which persist, and the losers, in every in-
stance, are the parties who expect their day in court but instead
feel the sting of the denial of justice.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Leading Members of the Senate, particularly Republican mem-
bers, have long called for reform of the confirmation process of ju-
dicial nominees and an end to the filibuster. For example, in 2003
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) published an article in the Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy that clearly stated the case
against filibusters. He discussed the history of filibusters, the
weak justifications senators give for filibusters, and the need for
reform. He concluded:
Instead of fixing the problem [with the judicial confirmation process],
we nurse old grudges, debate mind-numbing statistics, and argue
about who hurt whom first, the most, and when.
It is time to end the blame game, fix the problem, and move on.
Wasteful and unnecessary delay in the process of selecting judges





no matter who occupies the White House and no matter which party
is the majority party in the Senate. Unnecessary delay has for too
long plagued the Senate's judicial confirmation process. And filibus-
44
ters are by far the most virulent form of delay imaginable.
Unfortunately, Senator Cornyn changed course and in 2011
voted to support a filibuster of Goodwin Liu's nomination to the
Ninth Circuit." Most of the objections made on the floor to Liu's
nomination seem to be the kind of "old grudges" to which we
thought Senator Cornyn had objected in his 2003 law review arti-
cle.46
We suggest a proposal that will realize Senator Cornyn's stated
objective of putting an end to the filibuster in all but the most ex-
ceptional circumstances.
First, Senate confirmation hearings should never be delayed
provided that the nominee has complied with reasonable requests
for information from the Judiciary Committee. Committee rules-
or norms-should provide that a hearing must be scheduled for a
date within ninety days of when the President sends a nomina-
tion to the Senate.
Second, the Senate should continue to adhere to its agreement
earlier this year to bar the use of anonymous holds-and to forego
similar mechanisms-to delay any nomination. Until recently,
"secret" holds-where senators did not reveal reasons for holding
up nominations or sometimes their own identities-were particu-
larly noxious, but regardless, no senator should be permitted to
delay either a floor or Committee vote on a judicial nomination. 4
In keeping with the Senate's overwhelming agreement to bar
anonymous holds of judicial nominations, senators should agree
to accommodate brief delays of up to thirty days for a floor or
Committee vote if a senator, with the support of one other sena-
tor, states a good reason for the delay and why his or her concerns
44. John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibus-
ter Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 227 (2003).
45. James Oliphant, GOP Blocks Judicial Appointments, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2011, at
AA1.
46. See Cornyn, supra note 44, at 227.
47. See Kane, supra note 13 (discussing Senate leaders' agreement to repeal the
stalling tactics of secret holds).
48. See Alexandra Arney, The Secret Holds Elimination Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
271, 271 (2011) (noting that some senators place their holds in secret, disclosing their
identity and reason for their hold only to Senate leadership).
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could not have been addressed earlier. Otherwise the scheduled
vote should proceed as planned. We consider the most appropri-
ate reason for delay to be a specified need for more information
critical to the Committee's evaluation of a nominee's integrity and
qualifications. Fishing expeditions and delay for delay's sake are
never legitimate.
Third, once a judicial nominee has been reported out of the
Committee and the nomination has been sent to the Senate floor,
the presumption in the Senate should be that a majority of "yes"
votes are needed to confirm the nominee. We expect such an up or
down vote would be the end of the process for almost all nomi-
nees.
Occasionally, some senators will believe that there are "ex-
traordinary circumstances" that justify blocking a judicial nomi-
nee. One approach-and we believe a legitimate one-would be
for those senators to agree to a procedure in which they could
simply vote "no" and still allow the nominee to be confirmed if the
majority of the Senate is likely to vote "yes." Another legitimate
approach would be for the objecting senators to be permitted to
introduce a resolution stating with specificity their objections to
the nomination, and if the resolution received a certain number of
affirmative votes (at least forty-five) from other senators, it would
delay a confirmation vote on the nominee for a period of time,
perhaps until the next Congress is seated. After this time, there
would be an up or down vote and no further delay if the President
has resubmitted the same nomination. This delay would ensue
even if a majority of senators voted against the delaying resolu-
tion, but there would be an end in sight as a similar resolution
could not be introduced to further delay the same nominee in the
next Congress. This procedure furthermore would force the ob-
jecting minority of senators to clearly state their objections to the
nomination and convince at least a substantial minority of their
colleagues to vote in support of the same objections. Senators op-
posing the nomination for other reasons, but unwilling to vote in
favor of the stated objections, would not be counted toward the
number of votes required for delay unless these senators were to
introduce their own resolution and convince the requisite number
of senators to vote in favor of it. We believe the best mechanism
for implementing our suggested standard is through an agree-
ment between the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
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This is the same mechanism that was recently used in fixing the
problem with anonymous holds over judicial nominations."
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF COMPROMISE
The future of obstruction of judicial nominations in the Senate
does not turn on the constitutionality of the obstructive tactics
employed."o A debate over their constitutionality misses the point,
perhaps deliberately so. The future of delay turns instead on a
simple policy question-whether a delay or reaching a final vote
on a judicial nomination, whatever it may be, is in the best inter-
ests of the country, the President, the Senate, and the federal ju-
diciary. When framed in this manner, we think the answer is ob-
vious.
More specifically, we believe that our proposal has several ad-
vantages compared with the present situation. First, we contem-
plate that more than forty senators be required to delay a nomi-
nee. We have to choose a somewhat arbitrary number, but any
number that departs from a majority vote is an arbitrary number,
particularly when the Constitution specifically contemplated su-
permajority votes in the Senate in some situations but not in this
situation (e.g., conviction after impeachment and ratification of a
treaty require a two-thirds vote)." The more a number falls below
fifty percent, the more arbitrary the number is for defining the
size of a minority that will be empowered to block the will of the
majority (and the will of the President). Forty-five senators, at
least, should be required, and perhaps more. Second, when the
minority frustrates the will of the majority, each member of the
minority should be required to state openly his or her reasons for
doing so. Ideally, the minority should be able to state its reasons
clearly in the form of a resolution on which the full body would
vote. This would ensure that everyone's position on the need for
obstruction is on the record. Third, our proposal only envisions
delay, not permanent blockage of a nominee, as is now the case
49. See Josiah Ryan, Senate Ends Practice of Secret Holds, THE HiLL (Jan. 27, 2011,
6:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/140811-senate-ends-practice-of-secret
-holds.
50. For a recent review of the constitutional arguments pertaining to the recent delays
of judicial nominations, see Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Debate, Is the Filibuster
Constitutional?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 245 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com
/debates/pdfs/Filibuster.pdf.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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with the filibuster. As England recognized when it reformed the
House of Lords in the Parliament Act of 1911, delay by a minority
is perhaps an appropriate tool to slow the momentum of a majori-
ty; but delay of a vote should not be permanent in a government
that is supposed to reflect the will of the people.52
We believe this proposal is more than enough to prevent "ex-
treme" nominees from being confirmed to the federal judiciary.
The most effective way of avoiding extreme appointments to the
federal bench is not the filibuster, but the political process itself.
Nobody has control over the conduct of judges after they are con-
firmed to lifetime positions, and yet the President will be held ac-
countable if someone he puts on the bench makes judicial deci-
sions that are outside the mainstream. The President will pay a
political penalty for nominating left-wing or right-wing ideologues
to the courts, not only at the polls, but in the much greater scru-
tiny that the Senate and the public are likely to give to his other
nominees. Senators who vote to confirm extreme nominees and
who defend such nominees in the Committee and on the floor also
will pay a political price if these nominees' views depart from pre-
vailing public opinion. In sum, the checks and balances of the po-
litical process are sufficient to keep extremists off the courts
without any minority blockage power in the senate and certainly
without a filibuster supported by as few as forty-one senators.
We believe that a final benefit of this proposal is that it will
improve the Senate institutionally. We think that this proposal,
or one like it, is in the best traditions of the Senate. Just like the
original agreement of the Gang of 14 and the recent agreement to
bar anonymous holds of judicial nominations, our proposal pro-
vides a bipartisan solution to a problem that has hurt leaders
from both parties and the judicial nominees whom they have sup-
ported.
We fully appreciate the tradition among senators to respect
each other's autonomy, and our proposal does not seek to dimin-
52. The Parliament Act of 1911, which was subsequently amended by the Parliament
Act of 1949, allowed the House of Lords to delay, but no longer permanently block, bills
from the House of Commons. The Act imposed a maximum delay by the House of Lords of
one month on revenue bills and a maximum delay of one year on other bills. The United
Kingdom continues to consider proposals for further reform of the House of Lords to bring
it closer into alignment with the principle of majority rule. Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2
Geo. 5, c. 13, §§ 1 & 2 (Eng.) (amended by Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 103).
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ish that autonomy. It only asks senators to explain the principles
and justifications motivating their votes to each other, the Presi-
dent, and judicial nominees.
IV. CONCLUSION
We probably will have to wait until January 2013 for any re-
form of the confirmation process to be implemented, and only
then if its basic outline can be agreed upon before it becomes
clear who will win the 2012 presidential election. Until then, we
can expect the Senate to continue to do what it has been doing:
confirming some of the President's nominees but refusing to hold
a hearing on or filibustering others. As the presidential election
approaches, we should expect such strategic behavior to increase
as Republicans hope to regain the White House, though we hope
Senate leaders could reach accord in the meantime to forego fili-
busters of well-qualified nominees who do not threaten well-
settled doctrine and have the requisite integrity.
There is, however, a price for these political games, which are
played by both parties', often switching sides as their relative po-
sitions change: voters will lose confidence in our republican form
of government and increasingly believe that elected leaders are in
it for themselves, rather than for the good of the country. The
proposal we have outlined here is our attempt to change that.
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